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Cost of Goods Sold-An Unwarranted Exception to the
Public Policy Doctrine
I. INTRODUCTION
Any calculation of federal income tax liability must begin with
an identification of a taxpayer's gross income. For some income-
producing activities, arriving at gross income is simply a matter of
totalling the gross receipts the activity generates during a given
period. Personal services yielding wages, fees, and commissions
are common examples of income-producing activities in which gross
receipts and gross income are synonymous.' For other income-
producing activities, however, the two concepts diverge, necessitating
a subtraction from gross receipts in order to arrive at gross income.
One example is "gross income derived from business." '2 Treasury reg-
ulations interpret these ambiguous statutory words to require taxpay-
ers engaged in manufacturing, merchandising, or mining to calculate
gross income by subtracting the "cost of goods sold" from their total
sales.3
Defining gross income does not end the matter, however, for the
tax rates apply to taxable income, not to gross income.4 To arrive at
taxable income, the Internal Revenue Code permits certain deduc-
tions from the taxpayer's gross income.5 For taxpayers engaged in
a trade or business, the most important deduction is for "ordinary
and necessary" expenses of carrying on the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness.7 Yet, because the Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury regu-
lations define gross income as gross receipts for some activities but
as gross receipts minus the cost of goods sold for others, taxpayers
engaged in the latter activites are permitted subtractions to arrive at
gross income, while others are permitted only deductions from gross
income.
The level at which a taxpayer is permitted to make the subtrac-
tion can, under present law, lead to markedly differing tax treatment
for taxpayers who make illegal bribes, kickbacks, or rebates. If the
illegal transaction is considered to be a part of the "cost of goods
sold," it can be subtracted in full to reduce the base for application
1. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1).
2. I.R.C. § 61(a)(2).
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3(a); T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 164 (1973).
4. See I.R.C. §§ 1, 63(a).
5. See, e.g., LR.C. §§ 143-250. Included are trade or business expenses (§ 162),
interest (0 163), taxes (§ 164), losses (§ 165), and depreciation (§ 167).
6. See E. GRISWOLD & M. GAmrz, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATON 230 (1976).
7. See I.R.C. § 162 (a).
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of the tax rate. If, on the other hand, it is taken into accounit as a
"deduction," it can not be subtracted. The difference, reaffirmed by
two recent Tax Court decisions,' is that the frequently criticized ' but
firmly entrenched public policy doctrine applies only to deductions."
The result is that a seller of services is precluded from deducting
illegal bribes, kickbacks, and rebates, while a seller of goods may be
permitted to subtract them as a part of the cost of goods sold."
While the Code originally defined a deductible business expense
only as one both "ordinary and necessary," 2 courts added the proviso
that payments made in violation of a public policy'3 could not be
deducted in arriving at taxable income." A deduction was denied
8. Compare Max Sobel Wholesale Liquors v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 477 (1977),
appeal docketed, No. 78-2833 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 1978) (discussed at notes 61-75 infra
and accompanying text) with Alex v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 322 (1978), appeal
docketed, No. 78-3032 (9th Cir. Sept. 11, 1978) (discussed at notes 36-42 infra and
accompanying text).
9. See, e.g., Meltzer, Are Proposed Kickback Regulations an Unwarranted Ex-
tension of the Code?, 38 J. TAX. 166 (1973); Taggart, Fines, Penalties, Bribes and
Damage Payments and Recoveries, 25 TAx L. REv. 611 (1970); Note, Federal Income
Taxation-Public Policy and Deductibility of Kickbacks Under I.R. C. § 162(c)(2), 35
OHIo ST. L.J. 686 (1974).
10. The public policy doctrine as codified in § 162(c) (2) begins with the provision
"[n]o deduction shall be allowed ..... " (emphasis added). The cost of goods sold is
not a deduction. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a), T.D. 7345, 1975-1 C.B. 51 (1975).
11. See, e.g., Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 173
(1961); Tri-State Beverage Distrib., Inc. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 1026 (1957); Pitts-
burgh Milk Co. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 707 (1956); Harmony Dairy Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 582 (1960); Rosedale Dairy Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 16
T.C.M. (CCH) 1121 (1957).
12. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(a)(1), 53 Stat. 12 (1939).
13. The term "public policy'" is difficult to define. "Generally, however, the
concept of violation of public policy is connected with that which is illegal, immoral,
or tends to the injury of the public welfare." Annot.,.27 A.L.R.2d 498, 504 (1953).
14. See, e.g., 'Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958);
United Draperies, Inc. v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 813 (1965); Dixie Machine Welding & Metal Works, Inc. v. United States, 315
F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1963). Some courts reached this result by holding that illegal pay-
ments are not "necessary." See, e.g., Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356
U.S. 30, 33 (1958) ("A finding of 'necessity' cannot be made . . . if allowance of the
deduction would frustrate sharply defined national or state policies . . . ."); Finley v.
Commissioner, 255 F.2d 128, 134 (10th Cir. 1958). See also S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 273 (1969), 1969-3 C.B. 423, 596; 27 A.L.R.2d 498, 508 (1953); Annot., 16 L.Ed.
2d 1117, 1123 (1967). This approach, however, is inconsistent with the generally ac-
cepted rule that the "necessary" requirement means -only that the expense need be
"appropriate and helpful." See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933). Thus,
the analysis of the public policy doctrine as an exception to the "ordinary and neces-
sary" requirement rather than as a limitation seems preferable. See Heininger v.
Commissioner, 133 F.2d 567, 570 (7th Cir.), affl'd, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
[Vol. 63:965
COST OF GOODS SOLD
when the payment violated a "sharply defined" legislative policy,'5
with the courts focusing on the "severity and immediacy of the frus-
tration resulting from allowance of the deduction.' 6 Since distin-
guishing "sharply defined" policies from "less defined" policies was
no easy task, decisions reached under this standard lacked consist-
ency,'" and taxpayers were unable to predict whether a given pay-
ment would violate what the courts might later label a "sharply
defined legislative policy."''
Reacting to criticism'9 of the imprecise public policy doctrine,
Congress added section 162(c)(2) to the Code with the Tax Reform
Act of 1969.20 This new section was intended to articulate a more
15. This standard was first announced in Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S.
467, 474 (1943).
16. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958); see Com-
missioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 694 (1966).
17. See cases cited in Note, Business Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy:
Some Problems of Sanctioning with the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.J. 108, 109
n.4 (1962). See also Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28-29 (1958) (although
payment of rent for the use of premises for bookmaking was illegal under Illinois law,
deduction was allowed since the "amounts paid . . .to the landlord as rent are
'ordinary and necessary expenses' in the accepted meaning of the words").
18. See cases cited in Note, supra note 17, at 110 nn.5-13. Taxpayers had to
determine not only whether an expenditure was in contravention of a sharply defined
policy but also the directness of the relationship between the expenditure and the
illegal act itself. See Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 474 (1943) (deduction
not barred by "the mere fact that an expenditure bears a remote relation to an illegal
act .... ."). The issue was yet further complicated by the fact that "[e]ven if a public
policy is evidenced by a criminal or civil statute, administrative regulation, or court
decision, there may be evidence of a conflicting public policy." Annot., 16 L.Ed.2d
1117, 1125 (1967); see Note, supra note 17, at 116.
19. See Diamond, The Relevance (or Irrelevance) of Public Policy in Disallow-
ance of Income Tax Deductions, 44 TAXES 803 (1966); Dreyfous, Ethical Concepts and
Public Policy Determining Allowable Deductions Under Section 23(a), 6 VAND. L. Rv.
108 (1952); Gordon, The Public Policy Limitation on Deductions from Gross Income:
A Conceptual Analysis, 43 IND. L.J. 406 (1968); Koster, Fines, Kickbacks, and Illegal
Business Operating Expenses: When Are They Deductible?, 3 TAX. FOR AccOUNTANTS
340 (1969); Lindsay, Tax Deductions and Public Policy, 41 TAXES 711 (1963); Paul, The
Use of Public Policy by the Commissioner in Disallowing Deductions, 1954 S. CAL. TAX
INsT. 715; Reid, Disallowance of Tax Deductions on Grounds of Public Policy - A
Critique, 17 FED. B.J. 575 (1957); Schwartz, Business Expenses Contrary to Public
Policy: An Evaluation of the Lilly Case, 8 TAx L. REv. 241 (1953); Van Alstyne &
Barton, Income Tax Litigation: The Arena for Morals?, 38 NEB. L. REv. 692 (1959);
Zimmerman, Fast-Growing Public Policy Doctrine Threatens Many Necessary
Expenses, 12 J. TAx 106 (1960); Note, Public Policy and Federal Income Tax
Deductions, 51 COLum. L. REv. 752 (1951); Note, supra note 17.
20. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 710 (1969). I.R.C. §
162(c)(2) provides:
No deduction shall be allowed ... for any payment made, directly or indi-
rectly, to any person if the payment constitutes an illegal bribe, illegal kick-
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objective standard of which public policies were sufficiently impor-
tant to justify denying a tax deduction.2 ' Under section 162(c)(2), to
warrant denial of a deduction, the payment must violate= a public
policy expressed in a federal statute or in a generally enforced state
statute.2
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC POLICY RATIONALE
FOR DENYING BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS
The public policy doctrine has long been invoked to bar deduc-
tion of illegal business payments. Thus, for example, taxpayers have
been denied deductions for fines and penalties, 24 expenses involving
back, or other illegal payment under any law of the United States, or under
any law of a State (but only if such State law is generally enforced), which
subjects the payor to a criminal penalty or the loss of license or privilege to
engage in a trade or business. For purposes of this paragraph, a kickback
includes a payment in consideration of the referral of a client, patient, or
customer.
21. "The provision for the denial of the deduction for payments. . . which are
deemed to violate public policy is intended to be all inclusive. Public policy, in other
circumstances, generally is not sufficiently clearly deinfed to justify the disallowance
of deductions." S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 274 (1969), 1969-3 C.B. 423, 597.
22. Originally, § 162(c) stated that the deduction would be disallowed only in
cases in which the taxpayer pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to a charge of having
violated such a statute. Congress determined, however, that this requirement could
"unduly restrict the denial of deductions." S. REP. No. 437, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 72
(1971), 1972-1 C.B. 599. The Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 525,
retroactively removed the requirement that the taxpayer plead either guilty or nolo
contendere, amending I.R.C. § 162(c)(2) to provide that the IRS was to decide whether
the statute had been violated. In order to protect the taxpayer, the burden of proof in
such a case is explicitly placed on the IRS, and the standard is that which is required
to establish fraud as specified in § 7454.
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18(b)(3), T.D. 7345, 1975-1 C.B. 52, defines the term
"generally enforced" as follows:
For purposes of this paragraph, a State law shall be considered to be gener-
ally enforced unless it is never enforced or the only persons normally charged
with violations thereof in the State (or the District of Columbia) enacting
the law are infamous or those whose violations are extraordinarily flagrant.
For example, a criminal statute of a State shall be considered to be generally
genforced unless violations of the statute which are brought to the attention
of appropriate enforcement authorities do not result in any enforcement
action in the absence of unusual circumstances.
24. See Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958); Commis-
sioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943); Sachs v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 879 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960); National Brass Works, Inc. v. Commissioner,
182 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1950); Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148
F.2d 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945).
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illegal liquor transactions,2 kickbacks,"5 "immoral expenditures," 2
and bribesYs Taxpayers in such cases paid taxes on an amount ex-
ceeding their net income in an accounting sense. Thus, if a taxpayer's
gross receipts are defined as his gross income under section 61 and
all his expenses are barred from deductibility by the public policy
doctrine, his taxable income would be equivalent to his gross receipts.
This can lead to dire tax consequences for some taxpayers, especially
those in businesses that have a high volume of activity, yet only a
modest net income.
A. APPLYING THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE TO INSURANCE COMMISSIONS
An excellent illustration of the public policy bar to to deductibil-
ity can be found in cases involving insurance commission kickbacks
and rebates.
In Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, Inc. v. Commissioner, 2 the taxpayer
was an insurance agency that had returned a portion of its commis-
sions on the sale of automobile insurance to automobile dealers who
referred their customers to the taxpayer. The payments violated a
state statute allowing rebates to be given only to licensed insurance
agents." Although the taxpayer argued that the rebates should re-
duce its gross income, the Tax Court disagreed, finding that the
taxpayer's gross premiums constituted its gross income. Once that
had been concluded, the result followed inexorably: no deduction was
allowed for the illegal payment because of the public policy doctrine.
In a closely related case, Schiffman v. Commissioner,"' the Tax
Court adopted a different perspective, determining that it had before
it an issue of the definition of gross income rather than deductibility.
25. See United States v. Winters, 261 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 343 (1959); Finley v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1958); Smith v.
Commissioner, 33 T.C. 861 (1960); Lorraine Corp. v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 1158
(1936).
26. See United Draperies, Inc. v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 813 (1965). But see Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
27. See Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1931).
28. See United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
964 (1974); Alexandria Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 95 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1938); United
States v. Goldman, 439 F. Supp. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Cooke v. Teleprompter Corp.,
334 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
29. 25 T.C. 43 (1955).
30. Id. at 45-46. Although the taxpayer maintained that it should be allowed to
exclude the rebates from gross income on the ground that it had engaged in a series of
joint ventures with the automobile dealers, this argument was rejected because the
dealers "acquired no proprietary interest in the business" and because there was no
"convincing evidence that the dealers and the petitioner ever intended that the rela-
tionship between them should be that of a joint venture." Id. at 48.
31. 47 T.C. 537 (1967).
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The taxpayer, again an insurance agent, returned a portion of his
commission directly to his customers as an inducement for them to
purchase life insurance from him. Distinguishing Boyle on the ground
that it dealt with payments to third parties whereas the case before
it dealt with payments to the customer,12 the Schiffman court held
that the payments were properly excludable from gross income when
paid to the purchaser of the insurance.33 Relying on Pittsburgh Milk
Co. v. Commissioner,34 the court concluded that the entire transac-
tion should be viewed as a single event yielding net commissions;
therefore, only net commissions should be considered gross income5
In Alex v. Commissioner3 6 the Tax Court repudiated its
Schiffman analysis, returning to the view that illegal insurance com-
mission rebates are prohibited deductions, not adjustments to gross
income. In Alex, the taxpayer/life insurance agent, as in Schiffman,
violated state law by returning portions of his commissions to his
clients as an incentive for them to purchase insurance. On his income
tax returns, he reported these illegal payments as "cost of goods sold
and/or operations," labelling them as "discounted premiums."3 He,
like Schiffman, subtracted them from gross commissions to arrive at
his gross income.
Unlike the approach in Schiffman, however, the Tax Court re-
sorted to a literal statutory analysis. Section 61 lists commissions as
an item of gross income." The Tax Court concluded, therefore, as it
had in Boyle, that the insurance agent had gross income in the full
amount of commissions received from the insurance company. The
proper rule, the court said, was that "any claim of exclusion from
gross income, based upon an adjustment to the purchase price result-
ing from a discount or rebate, should at most be available only to the
buyer or the seller."4 Since the insurance company, not the agent,
was the seller of the insurance, there was "no selling price to which
any adjustment as to him might be applied."4' The Tax Court justi-
fied its action by observing that any other result would "open the
door to wholesale evasion of the purposes of section 162(c). '
32. Id. at 541-42.
33. Id. at 542.
34. 26 T.C. 707 (1956). See notes 48-53 infra and accompanying text.
35. 47 T.C. at 542.
36. 70 T.C. 322 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-3032 (9th Cir. Sept. 11, 1978).
37. CAL. INS. CODE § 750 (West 1972).
38. 70 T.C. at 324.
39. I.R.C. § 61(a)(1).
40. 70 T.C. at 326.
41. Id. But see Winkler v. United States, 230 F.2d 766 (1st Cir. 1956).
42. 70 T.C. at 326. This obviously represents a shift in the approach the Tax
Court had taken earlier; in Schiffman the court had noted that "concepts of taxation
[Vol. 63:965
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B. APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE TO SELLERS OF GOODS
Sellers of goods are consistently accorded the treatment briefly
given to insurance agents in Schiffman and subsequently withdrawn
in Alex. No matter how egregious the statutory violation, so long as
a taxpayer's illegal payment is characterized as part of the cost of
goods sold, it is fully subtracted before arriving at gross income.
3
An early leading case espousing this approach is Sullenger v.
Commissioner." The taxpayer had purchased meat from wholesalers,
paying amounts in excess of the prices set by the Office of Price
Administration. The taxpayer treated as income only the excess of
the purchase price over the amounts actually paid for the meat.'
5
When the Commissioner attempted to disallow the deduction for the
amounts paid in excess of the OPA prices the Tax Court rebuffed his
efforts, asserting that "the cost of goods sold must be deducted from
gross receipts in order to arrive at gross income. No more than gross
income can be subjected to income tax upon any theory." '46 Although
the Tax Court offered neither authority nor its own analysis in sup-
port of this sweeping proposition, the language quoted has often since
been cited by other courts to justify reducing gross receipts by the
cost of goods sold, including illegal payments, to arrive at gross in-
come.47
In 1956, the Tax Court reached the same result in Pittsburgh
Milk Co. v. Commissioner." In that case, the taxpayer corporation
was engaged in selling milk at wholesale. Despite its awareness that
minimum prices had been established by the state, the corporation
entered into agreements with many of its customers to sell milk below
the legal minimum prices. To preserve the appearance of legitimacy,
the taxpayer first billed customers at the minimum prices and later
and considerations of local public policy do not necessarily have to go hand in hand."
47 T.C. at 542.
43. But see Solon Decorating Co. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 424 (6th Cir. 1958)
(per curiam), aff'g Zehman v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 876 (1957); N.A. Woodworth Co.
v. Kavanagh, 202 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1953) (per curiam), aff'g 102 F. Supp. 9 (E.D.
Mich. 1952); Weather-Seal Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1952) (per
curiam), aff'g 16 T.C. 1312 (1951); Pedone v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 288 (Ct. Cl.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 829 (1957).
44. 11 T.C. 1076 (1948).
45. Id. at 1076-77.
46. Id. at 1077.
47. See, e.g., Lashell's Estate v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1953);
Jones v. Herber, 198 F.2d 544 (10th Cir. 1952); Hofferbert v. Anderson Oldsmobile,
Inc., 197 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1952); Commissioner v. Weisman, 197 F.2d 221 (1st Cir.
1952).
48. 26 T.C. 707 (1956). See generally Comment, Illegal Costs as a Factor in Gross
Income, 9 STAN. L. REv. 813 (1957).
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offered them separate refunds to reduce the price to the previously
agreed upon sum. 9 Although the Commissioner disallowed the de-
duction on the ground that it frustrated the pricing policy expressed
in the state statute," the Tax Court refused to consider the public
policy issue at all, instead making the crucial finding that the milk
had not actually been sold for the prices established by the state but
at the net effective prices. The rebates, it said, were not deductions
from gross income, but were price adjustments reducing gross re-
ceipts." Although expressly refusing to condone such business prac-
tices,5" the court relied on language from Supreme Court decisions to
conclude that "[m]oral turpitude is not a touchstone of taxability''1
and, therefore, the amount of the illegal rebates was not included in
the taxable income of the corporation.
In succeeding years, the Commissioner presented the Tax
Court5 with a series of cases raising issues substantially identical
to those raised in Pittsburgh Milk.55 But in each case the Tax
Court refused to alter its position that illegal payments, so long as
they took the form of price adjustments, could be subtracted from
gross sales in calculating gross income. Finally, in 1962, the Commis-
sioner announced his acquiescence to the Pittsburgh Milk result,"'
and litigation in this area temporarily ceased.
After Congress enacted section 162(c) (2) of the Internal Revenue
Code,5" however, the Commissioner renewed the fight to extend the
public policy doctrine into the cost-of-goods-sold arena. In 1976, the
Commissioner withdrew his acquiescence in the Pittsburgh Milk re-
sult,5 8 and, in 1977, issued Revenue Ruling 77-24411 to clarify his
position. In the ruling, which dealt with a fact situation similar to
that in Pittsburgh Milk, the IRS asserted that illegal price rebates
could not be subtracted from gross sales in arriving at gross income.'
49. 26 T.C. at 711.
50. Id. at 715.
51. Id. at 714.
52. Id. at 716.
53. Id. (quoting Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 408 (1946)).
54. The Commissioner initially refused to acquiesce in the Pittsburgh Milk re-
sult. 1959-1 C.B. 6.
55. Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 173 (1961);
Bloomingdale Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 575 (1961); Harmony
Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 582 (1960); Rosedale Dairy Co. v. Com-
missioner, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 1121 (1957).
56. See 1962-2 C.B. 5.
57. The text of I.R.C. § 162(c)(2) is reproduced in note 20 supra.
58. 1976-2 C.B. 3.
59. Rev. Rul. 77-244, 1977-2 C.B. 58.
60. Id.
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In Max Sobel Wholesale Liquors v. Commissioner,6 the IRS pre-
sented the Tax Court with the first case in which it sought to apply
section 162(c)(2) directly to illegal price adjustments. The taxpayer
in Sobel was a wholesale liquor dealer required by state law to file
monthly price lists with the state and to refrain from selling below
those announced prices. The statute's aim was to prevent wholesale
liquor dealers from giving individual retailers preferential treat-
ment."2 In violation of the law, Sobel established a system for favored
retailers under which customer credits could be utilized to obtain free
liquor after the customer had purchased a given quantity at the legal
minimum price. Because the illegal rebates were made in goods
rather than cash, they were automatically reflected in lower closing
inventories, thus increasing the cost of goods sold 3 that Sobel sub-
tracted from its gross sales in calculating gross income for tax pur-
poses."
The Tax Court concluded that this subtraction of the price re-
bates from gross sales to reach gross income was proper. The sub-
stance of the agreement that Sobel had entered into, the court said,
was to provide a given quantity of liquor for a net price below that
required by the regulatory statute. 5 Having reached this conclusion,
it was a simple step to determine that section 162(c) (2) did not apply
to Sobel's acts, since that section merely denies the deduction of
61. 69 T.C. 477 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-2833 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 1978).
Still pending before the Tax Court is Haas Brothers, Inc. and D & D Wholesale
Liquors, Inc., No. 5219-76 (filed June 11, 1976), which presents a tax problem similar
to that of Sobel.
62. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 24756, 24862 (West 1964) (amended 1968, 1970),
provided that wholesale liquor and wine dealers were required to file price lists with
the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control of the State of California, with sales of
liquor and wine to be made only at the prices specified in such lists. As a practical
matter, the price lists were established by the distributors, since wholesalers who
refused to file the lists as provided by the distributors faced having their supply of
liquor cut off by the distributors. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Max Sobel Wholesale
Liquors v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 477 (1977). The validity of this state regulatory
scheme was brought into question by Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd.,
21 Cal. 3d 431, 579 P.2d 476, 146 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1978), which declared CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 24755 (West 1964) (dealing with minimum retail prices for distilled
spirits) to be an illegal restraint of trade under the Sherman Antitrust Act. The fact
remains, however, that at the time of the violations in Sobel, §§ 24756 and 24862 were
generally enforced. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 36 (1958),
suggests that a legislative amendment to the substantive state law does not preclude
application of the public policy doctrine. It is not clear whether this would also be true
when the statute is invalidated judicially.
63. See generally R. DAiLEY & L. WARBLE, ITEMS OF GROSS INcoME 65 (rev. ed.
1967).
64. 69 T.C. at 485.
65. Id. at 485.
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illegal payments from gross income. In support of its holding, the
court relied on Pittsburgh Milk."
The IRS had argued, however, that section 162(c)(2) was meant
to overrule the Pittsburgh Milk line of cases. 7 To dispose of that
argument, the Tax Court focused on the limited scope of the statute,
noting that the Pittsburgh Milk series of cases had ben decided on
the basis of calculating gross income rather than under the public
policy doctrine relating to deductions from which section 162(c)(2)
evolved. If Congress had meant to overrule Pittsburgh Milk, it would,
according to the Tax Court, have done so explicitly." Finding no such
intent in either the statute or the committee reports, the court con-
cluded that the precedent established was still good law."
The IRS had also sought to forestall public policy violators' use
of the cost of goods sold subtraction by promulgating an amendment
to Treasury Regulation section 1.61-3(a).1 That section states that
the cost of goods sold is to be determined "without subtraction of...
amounts which are of a type for which a deduction would be disal-
lowed under section 162(c), (f), or (g) in the case of a business ex-
pense. ' 17 ' The stated purpose of similar changes to the regulations
under sections 212 and 471 was to "prevent the Congressional intent
from being circumvented by the allowance under [other] sections of
deductions which Congress explicitly denied by its amendments to
section 162."11 But the Tax Court blocked this extension of the public
policy doctrine by construing section 1.61-3(a) "to preclude the de-
ductibility of an illegal payment charged to overhead in the cost of
sales of the type which might otherwise be deductible as administra-
tive or sales expenses. '73
This restrictive interpretation seems consistent with the legisla-
tive intent behind section 162(c)(2). Before that section was enacted,
a number of cases substantive statute indicated an intent to exclude
66. Id. at 482.
67. Brief for Respondent at 26-36, Max Sobel Wholesale Liquors v. Commis-
sioner, 69 T.C. 477 (1977).
68. 69 T.C. at 484.
69. Id. at 486 (citing S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 273 (1969), 1969-3 C.B.
423, 597).
70. Tress. Reg. § 1.61-3(a), T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163, 164. Unfortunately, the
modification to the Treasury Regulation was incorporated into a set of changes de-
signed to implement the use of the full absorption method of inventory costing pnd
thus direct attention may not have been focused on the implication of the modification
relating to illegal payments.
71. Id.
72. T.D. 7345, 1975-1 C.B. 51.
73. 69 T.C. at 485 (emphasis in original).
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illegal payments from the cost of goods sold.74 Almost uniformly, the
courts had determined that they should not be so exluded. Given this
history, it is unlikely that Congress, without explicitly addressing the
matter, intended that the distinctions that had been drawn up to that
time were no longer to be of any consequence. It is more probable that
Congress did not intend to alter the treatment given to a cost of goods
sold item when it enacted a statute dealing only with business deduc-
tions. Thus, Treasury Regulation section 1.61-3(a), if interpreted as
the IRS had intended, would exceed its congressional authorization
and consequently be invalid.75 To avoid this problem, the Tax Court
selected a restrictive but defensible interpretation that made the reg-
ulation nearly meaningless.
ll. MODIFYING THE SCOPE OF SECTION 162(c)(2)
By looking to the language of section 162(c)(2) in light of the
cases interpreting that statute, The Tax Court found support for its
determination that although the fact situation in Alex fell within the
confines of the public policy doctrine as codified in the section, Sobel
could not rightly be governed by that section. Accordingly, Sobel was
allowed to give effect to its illegal transfer of liquor in computing its
ultimate tax liability. Because the disparite treatment of Sobel and
Alex seems mandated by the Code, it is necessary for Congress to
modify the statutory structure within which these cases have been
decided if a change in result is desired.
A number of arguments may be raised against extending
162(c)(2). One argument that is likely to be made is that a statute
excluding items from the cost of goods sold would run afoul of the
sixteenth amendment by imposing a tax on something that in some
metaphysical sense is not income.76 Such an argument would be
74. See, e.g., Jones v. Herber, 198 F.2d 544, 545 (10th Cir. 1952); Commissioner
v. Guminski, 198 F.2d 265, 266 (5th Cir. 1952); Hofferbert v. Anderson Oldsmobile,
Inc., 197 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1952); Commissioner v. Weisman, 197 F.2d 221, 221-
22 (1st Cir. 1952). Even if the congressional intent is clear, however, the issue whether
cost-of-goods-sold items are constitutionally protected remains. See notes 76-84 infra
and accompanying text. See Note, Disallowance of Over-Ceiling Costs of Goods Sold:
The Defense Production Act of 1950, 4 SYRACUSE L. REv. 323, 324 (1953).
75. See I.R.C. § 7805; Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496,
500-03 (1948).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI provides: "The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." Because
of the breadth of this constitutional language, uncertainty as to the limits of congres-
sional power to tax remains. See 4 H. MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION §
5.01 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MERTENS]. For a useful discussion of the bounds of




premised on the conventional wisdom that gross income for tax pur-
poses is precisely what is intended by the term "income" in the
sixteenth amendment. Therefore, any extension of the definition of
gross income in the Code must first pass muster under the sixteenth
amendment. Consideration of the merit of such an argument requires
closer scrutiny of the distinction between items subtracted as part of
the "cost of goods sold" and those deducted as "expenses." Although
expenses are more or less universally acknowledged to be deductible
only as a matter of legislative grace," it has been argued that the non-
taxability of items included in the cost of goods sold has a constitu-
tional underpinning.8 Early tax cases defined income in terms of
gains, the best-known example being the Eisner v. Macomber70 state-
ment that income is "'gain derived from capital, from labor, or from
both combined,' provided it be understood to include profit gained
through a sale or conversion of capital assets."8 It is apparent that a
taxpayer gains nothing until he has recovered his costs of acquiring
the income upon which the tax is to be imposed. Viewed from this
perspective, however, expenses stand on an equal footing with cost-
of-goods-sold items." In either case, the taxpayer expends funds in
anticipation of realizing receipts in excess of those expenditures. Fol-
lowing this analysis to its logical conclusion, it would seem that Con-
gress could never tax anything more than a taxpayer's net income.
Yet, Congress has, with the approval of the Supreme Court, never
strictly limited itself to taxing only net income. One need look no
further than the well-established perception of expense deductions as
being discretionary." This hardly coincides with the notion that Con-
gress is constitutionally required to allow other "expenses"-those
labelled as part of "cost of goods sold"-to be subtracted in arriving
77. This doctrine that deductions are allowed only as a matter of legislative grace
originated in Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934)
("Unquestionably Congress has power to condition, limit or deny deductions from
gross income in order to arrive at the net that it chooses to tax."); accord, Burnet v.
Thompson Oil & Gas Co., 283 U.S. 301, 304 (1931).
78. See Sullenger v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 1076, 1077 (1948).
79. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). See also Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918);
Solicitor's Opinion 132, 1922-1 C.B. 92; Clark, Can Congress Tax "Gross Income"
Under Sixteenth Amendment?, 8 A.B.A. J. 513 (1922); Rottschaefer, The Concept of
Income in Federal Taxation, 13 MINN. L. REv. 637, 642 (1929).
80. 252 U.S. at 207 (quoting Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185
(1918)).
81. The subtraction of the cost of goods sold is often accepted by courts without
analysis of the reasons for the subtraction. See 4 MERsuS, supra note 76, at § 5.06;
May, Accounting and the Accountant in the Administration of Income Taxation, 47
COLUM. L. REv. 377, 382 (1947); Note, Taxability of Gross Income Under the Sixteenth
Amendment, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 274, 280 (1936).
82. See note 77 supra.
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at the base for the income tax.
There is, then, an inherent illogic in drawing a constitutional
distinction between the cost of goods sold and other business expen-
ses . 3 Allowing taxpayers engaged in the production or sale of goods
to rely on the sixteenth amendment to claim subtractions from gross
receipts while forcing taxpayers engaged in the provision of services
to claim subtractions from gross receipts only to the extent of legisla-
tive grace is a distinction that lacks a rational basis. Since the cost-
of-goods-sold subtraction for goods sold in the ordinary course of
business is authorized solely by regulation and custom, statutory
modification of the cost-of-goods-sold doctrine is proper when com-
peting considerations dictate. Thus, Congress should not feel con-
strained by constitutional limitations from extending the section
162(c)(2) prohibition to encompass items in the cost-of-goods-sold
category as well.8
Another reason for not extending the public policy doctrine t6
cost-of-goods-sold items might be that it departs from the established
policy, recognized by the courts, of imposing a tax on only net in-
come. For example, in Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,
the Supreme Court discussed the applicability of the public policy
doctrine in terms of weighing the competing tax goals of (1) taxing
only net income 6 and (2) denying deductions for public policy rea-
sons. When Congress subsequently codified the public policy doctrine
in section 162(c) (2), however, it implicitly struck the balance in favor
of implementing the public policy doctrine even if sacrificing the
objective of taxing only net income was the inevitable corollary.
Because the purposes behind the public policy doctrine are often
poorly articulated, it is difficult to determine whether this congres-
83. See Redford, Gross Income Is Not Income, 35 TAXES 851, 853 (1957); Note
supra note 81, at 282-83; Comment, Taxation-Cost of Goods Sold-Determinations
of Professional Bookmaker's Gross Income, 41 MINN. L. REv. 368, 370-71 (1957). The
constitutional distinction may have some validity when applied to transactions outside
the ordinary course of business, such as a sale of fixed assets, which represent a return
of capital. See id. at 370-71, 373 n.24.
84. The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly refused to permit taxpayers to include
illegal items in the cost of goods sold. See cases cited at note 43 supra.
85. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
86. See McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1944) ("Taxation on net,
not on gross, income has always been the broad basic policy of our income tax laws.")
(Black, J., dissenting); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473,477 (1940) ("The purpose here
is to tax earnings and profits less expenses and losses."). When the income tax was
first being considered in 1913, Senator Williams stated in floor debates that "the object
of this bill is to tax a man's net income; that is to say, what he has at the end of the
year after deducting from his receipts his expenditures or losses." 50 CONG. REc. 3849




sional policy favoring the doctrine is proper. There seem to be two
basic purposes behind the public policy doctrine. The first of these
is consistent with a general view that tax deductions are a type of
reward for certain types of activity or are a specific congressional
statement that such activities are to be sanctioned by allowing de-
ductions for engaging in that activity. Thus, it is perceived that those
who have violated a statute should not be able to achieve the tax
savings that flow from the deductibility of an expense item. Instead,
the deduction should be disallowed so that taxpayers can obtain tax
advantages only from engaging in legal activities. 7 This purpose of
the policy doctrine seems to merely reflect a general sense of equity
which may not be defensible on a more specific level.
The second purpose of the public policy doctrine, however, can
be expressed in more concrete terms: the doctrine operates to rein-
force substantive statutory mandates." If taxpayers were allowed tax
deductions for activities that violate the law, their incentive to com-
ply with the laws that regulate their business activities would be
lessened. Accordingly, the public policy doctrine denies a deduction
for these illegal expenses in order to avoid frustrating other legislative
objectives.
Whatever the merit of these purposes of the public policy doc-
trine, Congress has, by enacting section 162(c) (2), made the determi-
nation that these purposes outweigh competing considerations such
as the policy of taxing only net income. 9 The real question, then, is
not whether the purposes of the public policy doctrine outweigh these
other considerations, but rather whether payments made as part of
the cost of goods sold should be treated differently from payments
falling within the deduction category. In nearly all respects, a tax-
payer who makes an illegal payment and subtracts it as part of the
cost of goods sold is in the same position as one who makes an illegal
payment and deducts it as an expense." From a "moral" standpoint,
87. See generally Gordon, supra note 19, at 410-12.
88. See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 498, 503-04 (1953). Without this reinforc-
ing influence, the tax statutes could operate at cross purposes with other statutes. For
example, the taxpayer in Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30
(1958), intentionally violated weight restrictions and chose to pay the fines imposed
as a cost of doing business. Denial of a tax deduction in such a case increases the cost
of violating a regulatory statute and, accordingly, encourages taxpayers to comply with
it. Id. at 35. But see Gordon, supra note 19, at 411-12. In reaching its result, the
Supreme Court also noted that "judicial deference to state action requires, whenever
possible, that a state not be thwarted in its policy." 356 U.S. at 35.
89. See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text.
90. See Tyler,Disallowance of Deductions on Public Policy Grounds, 20 TAx. L.
REv. 665, 679 (1965). To the extent that one accepts an "accessions-to-wealth" concept
of income, the taxpayers are identically situated and should be accorded identical tax
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the two cases are indistinguishable. In each case the taxpayer's activ-
ity contravenes a sharply defined legislative policy. From a net in-
come standpoint, whether the illegal payment is characterized as an
exclusion from income or as a deduction is irrelevant.9' Each taxpayer
has an equal amount of net disposable income remaining at the con-
clusion of the overall transaction. Thus, simply as a matter of equity,
the two should be treated similarly under the Code.2 Yet, because
under current law one taxpayer's payment is labelled as an exclusion
from gross income rather than as a deduction, a tax difference results.
These taxpayers are similarly situated not only in economic terms,
but also in relation to the purposes of the public policy doctrine.
Allowing the illegal payment to result in a tax savings in either case
would have a detrimental effect on the substantive regulatory laws
involved. If the public policy doctrine is an effective means of rein-
forcing other statutes when applied to deductions, it is equally appro-
priate to apply it to the cost of goods sold.13
Moreover, by altering the mechanics of a transaction only
slightly, different tax consequences can result, again suggesting that
the distinction between taxpayers subtracting payments as part of
the cost of goods sold and those taking deductions is not material
from a public policy perspective. For example, if the taxpayer in
Sobel, had made payments to the purchasing agent rather than to the
buyer, the deduction would have been denied. Since the payment
would not have been given to the buyer of the goods, the result would
be controlled by Alex. Conversely, if in Alex the insurance company
itself, at the request of its agent, had agreed with the buyer of the
insurance to reduce the premiums on the policy by decreasing the
commission to its agent, the result arguably would have been con-
trolled by Sobel and the agent would have paid income taxes on only
the commission actually retained by him. Under present law, there-
fore, illegal transactions can often be structured to receive favorable
treatment. The Supreme Court relied on the accessions-to-wealth definition of income
in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (Items are taxable
as income when there have been "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized,
and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion."). See generally R. GOODE, THE
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 13-17 (rev. ed. 1976); H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION
41-58, 103-09 (1938).
91. Cf. Pedone v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 288, 291 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 829 (1957) (regardless of where an item is subtracted on the income tax form,
the tax ordinarily remains the same).
92. See H. SIMONS, supra note 90, at 106.
93. See Note, supra note 17, at 130 ("[T]he apparent distinction between cost
of goods sold and business expenses. . . is a distinction which is without significance
or relevance to the enforcement objectives of the federal or state regulatory legislation
.... "). See also Comment, supra note 48, at 820.
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tax treatment by careful planning.
If any change is to occur in the tax treatment of those who cur-
rently escape the public policy limitation on deductions because their
payments are labelled as cost-of-goods-sold subtractions, it must
originate with Congress rather than with the Treasury or the courts.
Because of the complex nature of thie modification needed, however,
a detailed statutory change risks being either overinclusive or under-
inclusive. Thus, the amendment to the Code itself should simply be
a direct and explicit authorization in section 61 for the Secretary of
the Treasury to promulgate regulations designed to exclude illegal
payments from the cost of goods sold. 4 Such an approach would
clearly announce congressional intent to overrule Pittsburgh Milk,
Sobel, and other cases of that type. 5
Once the authority has explicitly been given by Congress, the
Treasury could enact regulations to eliminate the "loophole" that
currently exists for illegal payments structured so that they are char-
acterized as exclusions from income rather than deductions. Such a
provision, which would amend the regulations to section 61 of the
Code, could be drafted as follows:
Amounts paid (directly or indirectly), including trade discounts
and sales allowances, that, if they were deductions, would be disal-
lowed under section 162(c), (f), or (g), shall not be utilized to (1)
reduce gross sales or (2) increase the cost of goods sold.
94. This statute would eliminate the objection raised to the present Treas. Reg.
§ 1.61-3(a). See notes 71-75 supra and accompanying text.
95. An alternative solution to the problem presented in Sobel and Alex is statu-
tory abolition of the distinction between the cost of goods sold and other "ordinary and
necessary" business expenses. Such a statute would not only simplify the tax law, but
would eliminate the practical problem of inequality of treatment between two classes
of taxpayers who make illegal business payments. The statute would probably meet
significant opposition, however, because the cost-of-goods-sold concept is so deeply
ingrained in tax practice. Eliminating the distinction between cost of goods sold and
other business expenses could, theoretically, also be accomplished by constitutional
amendment eliminating the distinction between direct and indirect taxes. The six-
teenth amendment itself does not authorize a tax on income; it merely removes the
requirement that such a tax be apportioned. William E. Peck & Co., Inc. v. Lowe, 247
U.S. 165, 172-73 (1918); Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1916). The
need for that amendment stemmed from the distinction between direct and indirect
taxes drawn in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 557 (1895). See 4
MERTENS, supra note 76, at § 4.08. Particularly since a tax on corporate income can
be characterized as an excise tax not subject to the apportionment requirement of U.S.
CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1, see Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 151-52 (1911); Sierk,
The Cost of Goods Sold Concept in Federal Income Taxation, 31 U. KAN. CITY L. Ra'.
327, 334 (1963), there is a legitimate question whether the distinction between direct
and indirect taxes is itself of continuing validity. But the process of constitutional
amendment should be reserved for pressing matters incapable of resolution except by
resort to extraordinary measures.
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To further assist in the interpretation of this provision, an example
could be included in the regulation as follows:
The taxpayer is engaged in the wholesale milk business for
which minimum prices are established by generally enforced state
statutes. These statutes require that milk be sold at no less than
$10x per unit. In violation of these statutes, the taxpayer sells milk
for $9x per unit. Since the $1x discount per unit has the effect of
reducing the taxpayer's gross sales, such discount will not be recog-
nized, since it would not be deductible under section 162(c)(2) if it
were a business expense. Accordingly, the taxpayer must report
gross sales of $10x per unit from this transaction.
Alternatively, if the taxpayer transfers an additional quantity
of milk to reduce the net effective price to the buyer below the $10x
per unit statutory minimum, the cost of such additional milk is not
includable in the cost of goods sold, because such inclusion would
have the effect of increasing the cost of goods sold by an amount for
which a deduction would have been denied under section 162(c)(2).
The proposed regulation departs from a policy of taxing only net
income, but this departure extends no further than does the deduc-
tions treatment of similar illegal payments under current law. Fur-
thermore, the proposed modification would have a number of advan-
tages over current law. First, refusing to allow illegal payments to
result in tax benefits would increase the public policy doctrine's rein-
forcement effect on state and federal statutes. Second, the new
scheme would operate to incrementally increase public acceptance of
the tax law itself, because similarly situated taxpayers would be af-
forded uniform treatment. Moreover, by removing the loophole avail-
able to those taxpayers who can characterize their payments as exclu-
sions rather than deductions, the proposed modification would elimi-
nate the incentive to attempt to characterize a transaction as falling
within that loophole. The result would be a decrease in litigation on
this issue. Finally, the overall revenues generated by the tax law
would increase.
Although the distinction between illegal payments subtracted
from the cost of goods sold and those treated as deductions may have
its origin in constitutional history, it currently lacks validity. By
expressly extending the public policy doctrine to apply to items tradi-
tionally considered as part of the cost of goods sold, Congress could
complete the codification process, begun with the enactment of
I.R.C. section 162(c)(2), in a manner that is equitable, certain, and
consistent with substantive statutory goals.
19791

Commercial Paper: Taking a Bank Money Order "For
Value" Under U.C.C. Section 3-303
As partial payment for an irrigation system, Bonanza Valley
Sales and Irrigation, Inc. (Bonanza) received a $10,000 personal
check from Steve Radloff drawn on his account with American Na-
tional Bank (American).' Bonanza presented the check to American
for payment and received, as it requested, a bank money order for
$10,000 payable to State Bank of Brooten (State Bank).2 Bonanza
delivered the bank money order to State Bank, where it was applied
to a loan made by State Bank to Bonanza. After making the appropri-
ate credit entries on the loan ledger, State Bank placed the money
order into the usual collection channels. American refused to pay the
money order, however, when it discovered that Radloff had stopped
payment on his check to Bonanza. 3 Upon learning of American's re-
fusal to honor the money order, State Bank obtained Bonanza's per-
mission to reverse the loan credit originally given Bonanza and
brought suit against American for wrongful stopping of payment.'
The trial court ordered judgment in favor of State Bank. On appeal,
the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that a payee who
conditionally accepts a bank money order in payment of an antece-
dent debt is not a holder in due course and the issuer of the bank
money order is therefore entitled to stop payment of the money order
and assert the defense of failure of consideration against the payee.
State Bank v. American National Bank, 266 N.W.2d 496 (Minn.
1978).
1. The check was made payable to Bonanza and Welte Enterprises. State Bank
v. American Nat'l Bank, 266 N.W.2d 496, 497 (Minn. 1978).
2. The bank money order was issued designating Bonanza's chief officer as remit-
ter (purchaser) and State Bank as payee. The instrument was signed by American's
assistant vice-president and cashier. Id.
3. Radloff stopped payment on his check at nine a.m., August 5. Bonanza pre-
sented the check to American at three p.m. the same day. Due to a computer malfunc-
tion, the American bank officer that signed the bank money order did not learn of the
stop payment order until August 7, when he stopped payment on the money order.
American notified State Bank of the stop order, and upon receipt of the money order,
returned it to State Bank with "payment stopped" stamped on it. State Bdnk v.
American Nat'l Bank, 266 N.W.2d 496, 497-98 (Minn. 1978).
4. After acquiescing to the reversal of the credit entries, Bonanza brought a
separate action against Radloff demanding payment of the full amount for the irriga-
tion system, including the amount of the bank money order. Brief for Appellant at 19,
State Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 266 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 1978). This suit was
compromised and settled prior to trial. There is some dispute, however, about whether
the amount of the money order was included in the settlement agreement. Compare
id. with Brief for Respondent at 15, State Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 266 N.W.2d
496 (Minn. 1978).
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A bank money order is a negotiable instrument issued by an
authorized officer of a bank to a named payee that operates as an
unconditional promise to pay the holder' upon demand. It is thus a
primary obligation of the bank,7 which acts as both the drawer and
the drawee of the money order.' Since a bank's obligation is the same
5. A holder is defined as "a person who is in possession of a document of title or
an instrument ... drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in
blank." U.C.C. § 1-201(20). For a holder to become a holder in due course, additional
requirements must be satisfied. See note 45 infra and accompanying text.
A remitter, the purchaser of a bank money order or cashier's check, is not a party
to the instrument. Therefore, he "is not a holder because the instrument is usually not
'issued or indorsed to him or his order or to bearer in blank."' Comment, Adverse
Claims & the Consumer: Is Stop Payment Protection Available?, 67 Nw. U.L. REv.
915, 916 & n.9 (1973) (quoting U.C.C. § 1-201(20)).
6. See, e.g., Bank of Niles v. American State Bank, 14 ll. App. 3d 729, 733, 303
N.E.2d 186, 188 (1973); State ex rel. Babcock v. Perkins, 165 Ohio St. 185, 187, 134
N.E.2d 839, 842 (1956); Cross v. Exchange Bank Co., 110 Ohio App. 219, 221, 168
N.E.2d 910, 912 (1958); 6 MICHiE ON BANKS AND BANKING ch. 12, § 13, at 359 (rev. perm.
ed. 1975). See also Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276, 278
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Harris v. Hill, 129 Ga. App. 403, 406, 199 S.E.2d 847, 851 (1973);
Meador v. Ranchmart State Bank, 213 Kan. 372, 376, 517 P.2d 123, 127-28 (1973);
National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 350, 268 A.2d 327,
328 (1970); Drinkall v. Movius State Bank, 11 N.D. 10, 14-15, 88 N.W. 724, 726 (1901);
2 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 3-104:18 (2d ed. 1971); Benson, Stop
Payment of Cashier's Checks and Bank Drafts Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
2 OHIO N.L. REv. 445, 446, 461 (1975); Comment, Uniform Commercial Code- Stop
Payment Orders-Cashier's and Teller's Checks-Dziurak v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., 23 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 518, 520 (1978).
7. See Ross v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 264 F.2d 262, 269 (4th Cir. 1959); Banco
Ganadero y Agricola v. Society Nat'l Bank, 418 F. Supp. 520, 523 (N.D. Ohio 1976);
Polotsky v. Artisans Say. Bank, 37 Del. 151, 157, 188 A. 63, 66 (1936); Gillespie v. Riley
Management Corp., 59 Ill. 2d 211, 216, 319 N.E.2d 753, 756 (1974); Meador v. Ranch-
mart State Bank, 213 Kan. 372, 376, 517 P.2d 123, 127 (1973); State ex rel. Chan Siew
Lai v. Powell, 536 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Mo. 1976); Thompson Poultry, Inc. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 199 Neb. 8, 9, 255 N.W.2d 856, 858 (1977); Moon Over the Mountain, Ltd. v.
Marine Midland Bank, 87 Misc. 2d 918, 920, 922, 386 N.Y.S.2d 974, 975, 977 (1976);
First Nat'l Bank v. Noble, 179 Or. 26, 54, 168 P.2d 354, 366 (1946); 2 R. ANDERSON,
supra note 6; Fox, Stopping Payment on a Cashier's Check, 19 B.C. L. REV. 683, 684,
686 (1978); Comment, Negotiable Instruments-A Cause of Action on a Cashier's
Check Accrues from the Date of Issuance, 4 N.M. L. REV. 253, 254 (1974); Comment,
supra note 6.
8. See, e.g., Bank of Niles v. American State Bank, 14 Ill. App. 3d 729, 733, 303
N.E.2d 186, 188 (1973); First Nat'l Bank v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank, 417
S.W.2d 317, 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). See also Ross v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 264
F.2d 262, 269 (4th Cir. 1959); Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276,
278 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 33 Conn. Supp.
641, 646, 365 A.2d 1222, 1224 (1976); Meador v. Ranchmart State Bank, 213 Kan. 372,
376, 517 P.2d 123, 127 (1973); National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J.
Super. 347, 351, 268 A.2d 327, 329 (1970); F. HART & W. WILLIER, 2 BENDER'S U.C.C.
SERVICE, Commercial Paper § 1.09(3) (1978); Benson, supra note 6, at 445; Fox, supra
note 7, at 683; Comment, supra note 7, at 254; Comment, supra note 6, at 520.
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whether it issues a bank money order or a cashier's check, courts and
commentators universally treat a bank money order as a cashier's
check.'
Most courts adopt the general rule that a cashier's check is not
subject to countermand by the remitter" or the issuing bank." This
is true whether a cashier's check is viewed as a draft or a promissory
note.'" Courts characterizing a cashier's check as a draft rely primar-
If a bank money order or cashier's check is viewed as a note rather than a draft,
see note 12 infra, the issuing bank is the maker of the note and not the drawer/drawee
of a draft.
9. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276, 277 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Bank of Niles v. American State Bank, 14 Ill. App. 3d 729, 733, 303
N.E.2d 186, 188 (1973); Thompson Poultry, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 199 Neb. 8, 9,
255 N.W.2d 856, 857-58 (1977); State ex rel. Babcock v. Perkins, 165 Ohio St. 185, 187,
139 N.E.2d 839, 842 (1956); Cross v. Exchange Bank Co., 110 Ohio App. 219, 221, 168
N.E.2d 910, 912 (1958); Bank of El Paso v. Powell, 550 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977); J. BRADY, THE LAw OF BANK CHECKS § 1.7 at 11 (Bailey ed. 1969); Bailey, Bank
Personal Money Orders as Bank Obligations, 81 BANKING L.J. 669, 674 (1964).
10. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 427 F.2d 395, 398 (5th Cir.
1970); United States v. Milton, 382 F.2d 976, 978 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 952
(1967); State ex rel. Chan Siew Lai v. Powell, 536 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Mo. 1976); Thompson
Poultry, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 199 Neb. 8, 9, 255 N.W.2d 856, 858 (1977); Leo Syntax
Auto Sales, Inc. v. Peoples Bank & Sav. Co., 6 Ohio Misc. 226, 229, 215 N.E.2d 68, 71
(1965); Benson, supra note 6, at 446; Fox, supra note 7, at 690.
11. See, e.g., Swiss Credit Bank v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 587, 588 (4th
Cir. 1976); Munson v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484 F.2d 620, 624 (7th Cir.
1973); Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 427 F.2d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Milton, 382 F.2d 976, 978 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 952 (1967);
Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Polotsky
v. Artisans Say. Bank, 37 Del. 151, 157, 188 A. 63, 66 (1936); Riverside v. Maxa, 45
So.2d 678, 680 (Fla. 1950); Meador v. Ranchmart State Bank, 213 Kan. 372, 376, 517
P.2d 123, 127 (1973); Scharz v. Twin City State Bank, 201 Kan. 539, 541, 441 P.2d 897,
899 (1968); Bruno v. Collective Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 147 N.J. Super. 115, 122 n.2,
370 A.2d 874, 877 n.2 (1977); First Nat'l Bank v. Noble, 179 Or. 26, 54-55, 168 P.2d
354, 366 (1946); Benson, supra note 6, at 446. But see Wilmington Trust Co. v. Dela-
ware Auto Sales, 271 A.2d 41 (Del. 1970). In Wilmington Trust, the bank issued a
cashier's check in exchange for a personal check drawn on it over a customer's stop
payment order. The court held that the bank could assert the personal defense of
failure of consideration against the payee of the cashier's check and refuse payment
thereon. The payee of the cashier's check in that case, however, was also the payee of
the personal check. The Delaware court held, therefore, that the payee had "dealt
with" the bank and, under U.C.C. § 3-305(2), personal defenses were good against the
payee. The Wilmington Trust case has been questioned by courts and commentators.
See, e.g., Munson v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484 F.2d 620, 624 n.8 (7th Cir.
1973); J. BRADY, supra note 9, § 13.4, at 342 & n.10 (Supp. 1979).
12. There is a division of authority on whether cashier's checks are properly
characterized as drafts or notes. Article 3 of the Code does not mention cashier's checks
or bank money orders, but does provide a general definition of the terms "draft" and
"note." A draft or bill of exchange is an order to pay, usually drawn on a bank, whereas
a note is a promise to pay. U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(a), (d). Although the Code provides that
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ily on two Uniform Commercial Code (Code) sections to support this
conclusion. The first is section 4-303, which provides that once a
drawee bank accepts a check, the drawer of the check cannot stop
payment.' 3 Since the drawer of a cashier's check is the drawee bank,
the cashier's check is accepted by the very act of issuance. Courts
have held, therefore, that payment cannot be stopped on such an
instrument." The second provision relied on is section 3-413, which
states that the "acceptor engages that he will pay the instrument
according to its tenor at the time of his engagement .... "15 Under
this section, courts have reasoned, the bank, having accepted the
cashier's check, is prevented from refusing payment.'" Similarly,
courts that view a cashier's check as a promissory note rely on section
3-413,'1 which provides that the engagement to pay an instrument
according to its original tenor is made by a maker as well as an
acceptor.'8
In addition to arguments based on specific provisions of the
Code, many courts have invoked general policy considerations in sup-
"[wihere there is doubt whether the instrument is a draft or a note the holder may
treat it as either," it also states that "[a] draft drawn on the drawer is effective as a
note." U.C.C. § 3-118(a). Nevertheless, most courts continue to follow the pre-Code
view that a cashier's check drawn by the bank upon itself is a draft accepted by the
bank by the very act of issuance. See, e.g., Swiss Credit Bank v. Virginia Nat'l Bank,
538 F.2d 587, 588 (4th Cir. 1976); Munson v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484
F.2d 620, 623-24 (7th Cir. 1973); Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 427 F.2d 395, 398
(5th Cir. 1970); Ross v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 264 F.2d 262, 269 (4th Cir. 1959). A
minority view, however, characterizes cashier's checks and bank money orders as
promissory notes representing the bank's promise to pay the holder. See, e.g., TPO Inc.
v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 1973); Banco Ganadero y Agricola v. Society Nat'l
Bank, 418 F. Supp. 520, 524 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Thompson Poultry, Inc. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 199 Neb. 8, 9, 255 N.W.2d 856, 858 (1977).
13. U.C.C. § 4-303(1)(a)-(b) provides in part that "[a]ny . . .stop-order re-
ceived by ... a payor bank ... comes too late to so terminate, suspend or modify
such right or duty [to pay an item or to charge its customer's account for the item] if
the ... stop-order ... is received ... after the bank has ... (a) accepted ... the
item ... [or] (b) paid the item in cash."
14. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276, 278
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); State ex rel. Chan Siew Lai v. Powell, 536 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Mo. 1976);
Thompson Poultry, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 199 Neb. 8, 9, 255 N.W.2d 856,858 (1977);
National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 349, 268 A.2d 327,
329 (1970).
15. U.C.C. § 3-413(1).
16. See, e.g., Central Bank & Trust Co. v. First Northwest Bank, 332 F. Supp.
1166, 1168-70 (ED. Mo. 1971); Meador v. Ranchmart State Bank, 213 Kan. 372, 376,
517 P.2d 123, 127 (1973); State ex rel. Chan Siew Lai v. Powell, 536 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Mo.
1976).
17. See, e.g., Central Bank & Trust Co. v. First Northwest Bank, 332 F. Supp.
1166, 1169 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
18. U.C.C. § 3-413(1).
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port of the position that cashier's checks cannot be countermanded.19
In the commercial setting, cashier's checks and bank money orders
are generally viewed as the equivalent of cash." Creditors are ordinar-
ily willing to take cashier's checks in lieu of cash since these instru-
ments are bank obligations rather than personal obligations of the
remitter.2 ' Since it is frequently impractical and unsafe to transfer
large amounts of cash, a cashier's check or money order serves an
important commercial function." If banks were allowed to counter-
mand cashier's checks, the utility of such instruments might be un-
dermined.2
The principle that cashier's checks are not subject to counter-
mand, however, is not applied literally by the majority of courts
because of the harsh effect of the rule in cases in which a bank has
issued a cashier's check by mistake or for insufficient consideration.
While many courts continue to assert that payment cannot be
stopped on a cashier's check,24 most courts allow a bank to decline
payment and assert its own defense of fraud,2 mistake, 2 or failure of
19. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276, 279
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Meador v. Ranchmart State Bank, 213 Kan. 372, 376, 517 P.2d 123,
128 (1973); Johnson v. First State Bank, 144 Minn. 363, 366, 175 N.W. 612, 613 (1920);
State ex rel. Chan Siew Lai v. Powell, 536 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Mo. 1976); National Newark
& Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 351, 268 A.2d 327, 329 (1970); First
Nat'l Bank v. Noble, 179 Or. 26, 38, 168 P.2d 354, 359 (1956).
20. See Manhattan Imported Cars, Inc. v. Dime Say. Bank, 70 Misc. 2d 889, 890,
335 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (App. Term 1972) (teller's check equivalent to cash); Malprhus
v. Home Sav. Bank, 44 Misc. 2d 705, 706, 254 N.Y.S.2d 980, 982 (Albany County Ct.
1965) (teller's check equivalent to cash); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMRCIAL CODE § 13.20, at 449 (1972). But see TPO Inc.
v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131, 136 (3rd Cir. 1973); Deones v. Zeches, 212 Minn. 260, 263, 3
N.W.2d 432, 433 (1942); Perry v. West, 110 N.H. 351, 354, 266 A.2d 849, 852 (1970).
21. State ex rel. Chan Siew Lai v. Powell, 536 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Mo. 1976) (quoting
National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 351, 268 A.2d 327,
329 (1970)); Benson, supra note 6, at 460-61; see Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
370 F. Supp. 276, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (quoting National Newark & Essex Bank v.
Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 351, 268 A.2d 327, 329 (1970)); Gillespie v. Riley
Management Corp., 59 Ill. 2d 211, 218, 319 N.E.2d 753, 756 (1974); Comment, supra
note 7, at 258. But see TPO Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 1973).
22. Benson, supra note 6, at 460-61; see Johnson v. First State Bank, 144 Minn.
363, 366, 175 N.W. 612, 613 (1920).
23. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276, 278-79
(1974); Meador v. Ranchmart State Bank, 213 Kan. 372, 376, 517 P.2d 123, 128 (1973);
Johnson v. First State Bank, 144 Minn. 363, 366, 175 N.W. 612, 613 (1920).
24. See notes 10-11 supra.
25. See, e.g., Bank of Coffee Springs v. McGilvray & Co., 167 Ala. 408, 409-11,
52 So. 473, 473-74 (1910); Thompson Poultry, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 199 Neb. 8, 9,
255 N.W.2d 856, 858 (1977); Benson, supra note 6, at 447.
26. See, e.g., National Bank v. Miner, 167 Cal. 532, 537, 140 P. 27, 30 (1914),
Wright v. Trust Co., 108 Ga. App. 783, 789, 134 S.E.2d 457, 462 (1963).
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consideration" against one who is not a holder in due course. 8
In State Bank, the Minnesota Supreme Court initially consid-
ered whether to strictly apply the rule that cashier's checks-cannot
be countermanded. It noted that cases decided under the Code29 had
reached conflicting results with respect to this issue," and then, cit-
ing TPO Inc. v. FDIC,3' concluded that "a bank may stop payment
on its own obligation if the obligation is in the hands of one who is
not a' holder in due course. 32
The State Bank opinion perpetuates a misconception that has
arisen in cases in which a bank has refused to pay a cashier's check
because it issued the check by mistake or without consideration. The
court framed the issue as whether American was entitled to stop
payment on the money order because of a failure of consideration.3
Whether the court viewed the bank money order as a promissory note
or a draft,34 this "stop payment" characterization is incorrect. Ac-
cording to the only Code section concerning stopping payment, a
"customer may by order to his bank stop payment of any item paya-
ble for his account . . . . "I Since the Code makes it clear that a
bank cannot be its own customer," section 4-403 does not apply to
27. See, e.g., Mine & Smelter Supply Co. v. Stock Growers' Bank, 200 F. 245,
247-48 (8th Cir. 1912); Banco Ganadero y Agricola v. Society Nat'l Bank, 418 F. Supp.
520, 524 (N.D. Ohio 1976); National Bank v. Miner, 167 Cal. 532, 539, 140 P. 27, 30
(1914); Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 33 Conn. Supp. 641, 647, 365 A.2d
1222, 1225 (1976); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Delaware Auto Sales, 271 A.2d 41, 42 (Del.
1970); Wright v. Trust Co., 108 Ga. App. 783, 789, 134 S.E.2d 457, 462 (1963); Bank
of Niles v. American State Bank, 14 Ill. App. 3d 729, 733-34, 308 N.E.2d 186, 189
(1973); Mid-Central Towing Co. v. National Bank, 348 P.2d 327, 329 (Okla. 1960),
Dakota Transfer & Storage Co. v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 86 N.W.2d 639,
643-44 (N.D. 1957); J. WrTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, § 14-11, at 490; see Smith
v. Nixon Piano Co., 110 Minn. 82, 86, 124 N.W. 637, 638 (1910); Wilderman v. Don-
nelly, 86 Minn. 184, 186, 90 N.W. 366, 367 (1902); Benson, supra note 6, at 447. But
see Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
28. The bank cannot invoke the defenses of the remitter, however. See U.C.C. §
3-306(d); Benson, supra note 6, at 450.
29. The Uniform Commercial Code was adopted in Minnesota by Act of May 26,
1965, ch. 811, 1965 Minn. Laws 1290, from the 1962 official draft. The official number-
ing system was retained with the addition of the chapter prefix, 336. Except as other-
wise noted, the statutory provisions cited herein are substantively unchanged from the
1962 official draft. 21A MINN. STAT. ANN., Preface at HI (West 1966). In this Comment,
textual references to provisions of the U.C.C. will be presented without repeated refer-
ence to the 1962 version or the Minnesota Statutes chapter prefix.
30. 266 N.W.2d at 498-99.
31. 487 F.2d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 1973).
32. 266 N.W.2d at 499 (emphasis in original).
33. Id. at 499.
34. See note 12 supra.
35. U.C.C. § 4-403 (emphasis added).
36. The Code defines a customer as "any person having an account with a bank
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drafts that are the bank's primary obligation.3 7 As one commentator
has noted,
it would be well for the courts to eschew the phraseology of
"stopping payment" when considering the question of a bank's right
to decline to pay [a cashier's check]. The phrase, rooted in the
concept that a customer has an absolute right to order his bank not
to pay, serves mainly to confuse the issue.3
Despite the court's misuse of stop payment terminology, it pro-
perly identified the primary issue in the case: whether American's
defense of failure of consideration was applicable in an action by
State Bank to enforce the instrument. Notes and drafts are both
negotiable instruments; 39 under the Code, transferees and holders of
negotiable instruments take them subject to personal and real defen-
ses." Holders in due course, on the other hand, take instruments free
from personal defenses and are subject only to real defenses.4' Failure
of consideration is a personal defense" and therefore is effective only
against one who is not a holder in due course. 3 Thus, as the court
recognized,4 the critical issue in State Bank was whether State Bank
was a holder in due course.
Section 3-302 of the Code defines a holder in due course as a
holder who takes an instrument for value, in good faith, and without
notice of any claim to or defenses against it.45 Since there was no
question that State Bank was a holder that had taken the bank
money order in good faith and without notice of any claims or defen-
ses, State Bank's status as a holder in due course depended on
whether it had taken the American bank money order for value. 6
Section 3-303(b) of the Code provides that a holder who takes an
instrument as payment for an antecedent debt takes it for value. 7 In
or from whom a bank has agreed to collect items and includes a bank carrying an
account with another bank." U.C.C. § 4-104(1)(e). An issuing bank having an account
with itself does not qualify as a customer under this definition. See Benson, supra note
6, at 448; Fox, supra note 7, at 685-86.
37. See Fox, supra note 7, at 685.
38. Id. at 697 (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 689; see U.C.C. § 3-104.
40. See U.C.C. §§ 3-305, -306, -408; Fox, supra note 7, at 687, 690.
41. See U.C.C. §§ 3-305, -408; E. PETERS, A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS PRIMER 32-
33 (2d ed. 1974).
42. See U.C.C. § 3-306(c).
43. Id. § § 3-305, -306(c), -408.
44. 266 N.W.2d at 498.
45. U.C.C. § 3-302.
46. See 266 N.W.2d at 499.
47. U.C.C. § 3-303(b) ("A holder takes the instrument for value ... (b) when
he takes the instrument in payment of or as security for an antecedent claim against
any person whether or not the claim is due.").
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Leininger v. Anderson,4" the court relied on this section to hold that
the application of cashier's checks to a preexisting debt constituted
taking for value. 9 Since State Bank had applied the bank money
order to Bonanza's debt with the bank, it would seem that the bank
took the money order for value under Leininger. The court distin-
guished Leininger from State Bank, however, holding that State
Bank had not taken for value because the credit entries made on the
loan ledger were "conditional or provisional."' 0
This reading of the Code is untenable, however. Since section 3-
303 refers to "taking" for value,5' the appropriate time for determin-
ing whether value has been received is when the instrument is taken.
In State Bank, there is no indication that either Bonanza or State
Bank viewed the payment as conditional at the time State Bank
received the bank money order and credited the amount against Bon-
anza's loan." Although Bonanza later allowed the credit reversal to
be made, under the most logical reading of section 3-303, value was
given when the bank money order was originally received by State
Bank in part payment for the loan.
The court also relied on section 3-802(1)(a) of the Code to sup-
port its holding that State Bank did not take the money order for
value. That section provides that "[u]nless otherwise agreed where
an instrument is taken for an underlying obligation. . . the obliga-
tion is pro tanto discharged if a bank is drawer, maker or acceptor of
the instrument and there is no recourse on the instrument against the
underlying obligor."" The court held that since Bonanza allowed
State Bank to reverse the credit entries on its loan, Bonanza and
If the holder is a bank, §§ 4-208 and 4-209 may be used to determine whether the
bank has given value for purposes of its status as a holder in due course. Section 4-209
provides that if a bank has a security interest in the item, it has given value, and
outlines when a bank has a security interest in an item. U.C.C. § 4-209.
According to the title of § 4-208, it applies to collecting banks. Id. § 4-208; see id.
§ 4-208, Official Comments 1, 3. A collecting bank "means any bank handling the item
for collection except the payor bank." Id. § 4-105(d). A bank that is a payee is,
however, treated as such under Article 3 and not as a collecting bank under Article 4
of the Code. Id. § 4-105, Official Comment 1.
The Minnesota Supreme Court followed this provision of the Code and correctly
rejected American's contention that State Bank should be treated as a collecting bank
under Article 4. 266 N.W.2d at 500. The court reasoned that when State Bank first
received the bank money order, it acted as a payee, not as a collecting bank. Only later
did State Bank handle the money order for collection. Id.
48. 255 N.W.2d 22 (Minn. 1977).
49. Id. at 27.
50. 266 N.W.2d at 500.
51. U.C.C. § 3-303.
52. 266 N.W.2d at 497-99.
53. U.C.C. § 3-802(1)(a).
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State Bank "otherwise agreed"; thus, payment was conditional.54
Consequently, the court concluded that State Bank did not take the
bank money order for value. 5
This conclusion is inconsistent with the language and apparent
purpose of section 3-802(1)(a). Under the most reasonable construc-
tion of that section, the agreement that the taking of a bank obliga-
tion will not constitute final payment must be made by the parties
at the time the instrument is received. Once the payee takes the
instrument without reserving the right to sue the debtor on the under-
lying obligation, section 3-802(1)(a) recognizes that payment should
be considered final, since recourse may be had by the payee against
the bank as a drawer, maker, or acceptor. If, as the court's opinion
suggests, payment is always conditional until the bank obligation is
actually paid, section 3-802(1)(a) would be rendered superfluous.
Even if the court was correct in its finding that payment was
conditional, the Minnesota Code Comment to section 3-303 indicates
that conditional payment by delivery of an instrument ordinarily
constitutes the giving of value. 7 The Comment states that "section
3-303 does not make clear whether the ordinary conditional payment
by indorsement [and] delivery of an instrument is a transfer 'for
value' . . . . Presumably it is . ... "58 In addition, the Comment
states that the section "establishes" that the taking of an instrument
in payment of an antecedent claim is value and "cannot be held to
be otherwise.""
Whether State Bank gave value because conditional payment
constitutes value or because the payment was final rather than provi-
sional, the court should have found that, having taken the money
order for value, State Bank was a holder in due course."0 Since per-
sonal defenses are ineffective against a holder in due course,6 tradi-
tional doctrine would have required the court to hold that American's
defense of no consideration failed.
Although it was incorrect to conclude that State Bank was not a
holder in due course, the reason the court thought that to be a desira-
ble result is clear. Since State Bank had reversed the credit entries
on Bonanza's loan account, it had sustained no loss as a result of the
54. 266 N.W.2d at 500.
55. Id. at 501.
56. See U.C.C. § 3-802, Official Comment 2; E. PETERs, supra note 41, at 45.
57. S. KINYON & R. McCLURE, A STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE ON MINNESOTA LAw 293 (1964), reprinted in MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.3-303,
Minnesota Code Comment, Subsection 3-303 (West 1976).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See notes 51-59 supra and accompanying text.
61. See notes 39-43 supra and accompanying text.
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unpaid money order. There was, therefore, no reason to require Amer-
ican to pay State Bank. The court thus reached an equitable result;
neither State Bank nor American sustained a loss, and any remaining
dispute was left to be resolved between the original parties to the
transaction, Radloff and Bonanza.12
The court could have reached the same result without straining
the Code's definition of "value," however, had it invoked the
"election" theory. This theory is based on the principle that a holder
in due course should not be allowed to exercise its rights on an instru-
ment once it has taken actions evidencing an "election" to hold other
parties liable. State Bank acted inconsistently with the exercise of its
rights as a holder in, due course when it reversed the loan credit
entries it had made in favor of Bonanza, since the reversal of the
credit entries restored Bonanza's full liability to repay its loan from
State Bank. State Bank thus made an "election" to hold Bonanza
accountable for the loan and refrain from exercising its rights as a
holder in due course of the bank money order against American.
Although no court has invoked an "election" theory to deny an
action by a holder in due course against the drawer or maker of a
negotiable instrument, one court indicated that it would have applied
such a theory had it not decided the case on alternative grounds. 3 In
Massachusetts Bank & Trust Co. v. McGillicuddy," the bank re-
versed a credit entry it had made to a customer's overdrawn checking
account after a third party's check deposited by the customer was
dishonored. The bank then sued the drawer of the check. In dictum,
the court noted:
Counsel for the defendant . . . contends . . . that the bank, by
charging [the check] back, has elected to hold [its customer] re-
sponsible and that it cannot therefore sue the maker of the check.
This contention would seem to have a lot of merit, and the position
of the bank, is to say the least, inconsistent, if not irreconcilable."3
In State Bank, the court could have invoked this election theory
and held that State Bank did have a cause of action against Ameri-
can. The principle advantage of this theory is that it does not defeat
the expectations of the parties. Because an election is a voluntary act,
both the bank and its customer can decide, in advance, whether they
wish to treat the instrument as valid payment. If the parties choose
62. See note 4 supra.
63. The court in Massachusetts Bank & Trust Co. v. McGillicuddy, 9 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 1235 (Mass. App. Div. 1971) decided the case on the ground that the
plaintiff bank did not overcome the statutory presumption that the credit entry was
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to consider the instrument invalid, they can expect a court to refuse
to hear their claim on the instrument; there is no uncertainty. In
contrast, the State Bank court's tampering with the requisites of
holder in due course status can only lead to uncertainty about the
value of bank money orders and other instruments. As a result, the
commercial utility of such instruments will be greatly decreased.
The court's determination that State Bank was not entitled to
recover from American appears to be equitable in this case, but the
court failed to present a convincing rationale for this result. -Had the
court held that State Bank was a holder in due course that had made
a binding election not to exercise its rights on the bank money order,
it could have avoided using strained interpretations of the Code's
"value" provisions. This would have allowed the court to reach an
equitable result while fulfilling a primary goal of the Code: preserving
the commercial utility of negotiable instruments.

